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Executive Summary
Responding to the Government of New Brunswick’s Green Paper on Local Governance Reform
released in April 2021, this report diagnoses the problems of the province’s existing system of local
governance and proposes a solution that leverages existing assets to create a more equitable,
democratic, responsive, and efficient local governance system. A reformed local governance system
will help New Brunswickers confront difficult present and future economic and demographic
challenges.
The report begins by describing the current system of local governance in New Brunswick.
Previous local governance reforms can be characterized as “provincial patching.” Since the 1960s,
reforms have been layered onto existing arrangements without resolving their inherent problems:
• the electoral disenfranchisement in unincorporated areas,
• an inequitable distribution of tax burdens,
• incentives to sprawl near urban centres, and
• the overcentralization of authority at the provincial level.
To date, New Brunswick has pursued two approaches to local governance reform: municipalization
and regionalization. Municipalization entails the incorporation as municipalities of areas now
directly administered by the province through the Local Service Districts. Only piecemeal
institutional restructuring has occurred over the past 25 years. Exemplified by the Regional
Service Commissions and the earlier District Planning Commission, regionalization involves the
creation of new bodies to coordinate municipal activities and deliver services in unincorporated
areas. Neither approach has been pursued to its logical conclusion.
This report recommends strengthening the Regional Service Commissions along the lines of
British Columbia’s regional districts—multi-purpose bodies that have coordinated service delivery
and land-use planning in that province since the 1960s. The report outlines the history of regional
districts, describes their key features, and shows how they could be implemented in New
Brunswick through modest reforms to the existing Regional Service Commissions. We call this
approach representative regionalization because it would strengthen local government, give a
democratic voice to the 30% of New Brunswickers who live outside of incorporated
municipalities, and distribute costs and benefits more equitably within regional housing and labour
markets. Importantly, representative regionalization would be minimally disruptive to existing
institutions and longstanding practices—indeed, much less disruptive than other potential options
such as forced municipal incorporation and amalgamation. Representative regionalization is not a
centralizing move. Rather, it would enhance local autonomy by empowering local democratic
institutions to make decisions in the interest of their communities.
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1. Introduction
On November 16, 1965, Premier Louis Robichaud rose in the New Brunswick legislature to
announce a far-reaching restructuring of taxation and expenditure, local government institutions,
and the provincial-local relationship (Robichaud 1965). His government’s goal was to redress
profound inequalities between the province’s many communities. He called on citizens to put
aside parochialism: “We must all, I suggest, begin to think and act like a Province of 600,000
people rather than continuing to segregate ourselves according to economic advantage or precise
geographic location” (5). Many of the institutional and fiscal changes brought about by
Robichaud’s Equal Opportunity reforms remain in effect today with little modification.
As the government’s recent Green Paper on local governance reform suggests, New Brunswick is
again “at a crossroads” (New Brunswick 2021, 1). As in 1965, the government is concerned about
several core issues, namely that:
• there are too many small units of government that lack the administrative and fiscal
capacity to deliver services efficiently,
• there is growing inequity in the level of services available to New Brunswickers in
different parts of the province,
• there is insufficient coordination of land-use planning and service delivery around the
larger urban centres, and
• there is a democratic deficit in unincorporated areas, which lack elected representation in
local governments.
Fifty years ago the government was concerned with challenges associated with growth. Today it
confronts problems associated with slow population, economic, and productivity growth; an ageing
population; and an expanding urban-rural economic divide. A reformed local governance system
will be an essential part of the response to these challenges.
In this report, we argue that New Brunswick has reached the limit of what can be accomplished
by what we call “provincial patching”—piecemeal reforms and one-off initiatives. At the same
time, we suggest that local governance reform need not entail the costly and disruptive
reconstruction of local government institutions through imposed incorporations and
amalgamations. Instead, we propose realizing the full potential of New Brunswick’s existing assets:
an efficient and effective system of provincial-local fiscal transfers and the existing multi-purpose
regional bodies known as Regional Service Commissions. We call this direction representative
regionalization because it addresses the issues identified above—capacity-building, inequity,
coordination, and the democratic deficit—at the regional scale.
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Figure 2.1: Administrative boundaries and settlement patterns

New Brunswick is governed by 104 incorporated municipalities and 236 Local Service Districts which
are coordinated by 12 Regional Service Commissions. Most of the population lives in incorporated
municipalities, which are mostly located on major waterways and along the coasts. Higher, more
urban, population densities are shaded in red; lower, more rural, population densities are shaded in
green.

7

2. The Context
Before offering directions for local governance reform, we first take stock of New Brunswick’s
context: its distinctive settlement pattern, local governance institutions, and provincial-local fiscal
relations. We then present an overview of the past fifty years of local governance reform. We
conclude the contextual discussion by surveying the economic and demographic challenges New
Brunswick faces.

The settlement pattern
New Brunswick is a small province in terms of population and territory. At 775,000, the province’s
population is slightly larger than that of Mississauga, Ontario. Half the provincial population lives
in only three urban centres: Moncton, Saint John, and Fredericton. Even the largest of the
province’s cities is small compared to midsize cities and large municipalities elsewhere in the
country. The province’s other urban settlements are mostly located on major waterways or the
coasts, and the rest of the population is thinly spread elsewhere. (See Figure 2.1.)

Local governance institutions
New Brunswick’s local governance system is complex, featuring multiple types of units with
different powers and responsibilities. (See Table 2.1.) Most of the 104 incorporated municipalities
in which 70% of New Brunswickers live have small populations.1 The median municipal
population is only 1,400. Smallness has both advantages and disadvantages. While small local
governments are potentially highly responsive to local preferences and needs, their modest fiscal
and administrative capacities render them dependent on the provincial government to perform
everyday tasks (New Brunswick 2021, 11–12).
Unlike in most provinces, a substantial proportion of the population—30%—lives outside the
jurisdiction of incorporated municipalities. In British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador,
residents of unincorporated areas mostly inhabit remote areas (McKendy 2017, 28). In New
Brunswick, by contrast, many of these residents live near or within urban areas. Many of the fastest
growing unincorporated areas are adjacent to the larger municipalities (Finn 2008, 16, 48).
Residents of unincorporated areas lack local electoral representation and are directly administered
by the provincial government through 236 Local Service Districts (LSDs). As prescribed by
s. 161(1) of the Local Governance Act, LSDs provide a variety of mandated local services, including
policing and fire protection, emergency measures, solid waste collection and disposal, property
standards enforcement, street lighting, and animal control. LSD residents may petition to assume

1. In this report, “municipalities” refers to incorporated local government entities with directly elected councils.

8

other matters, such as the management of local recreational facilities. These too are small entities;
the largest LSD has 9,736 residents, the smallest only 5, and the median 693.
Superimposed on the incorporated municipalities and LSDs are 12 Regional Service
Commissions (RSCs) governed by boards of directors comprising the mayors of member
municipalities and appointed representatives of unincorporated areas. As incorporated entities,
RSCs are similar to municipalities in that they have the power to buy and sell property, enter into
contracts, hire and fire staff, and so on. Created in 2013, these bodies are mandated to “provide or
facilitate the provision” of regional planning and solid waste services to their constituent entities
and manage land-use planning within unincorporated areas. They may also take on additional
functions with the agreement of their members. The legislation calls for them to “encourage and
facilitate cooperative action” regarding policing, emergency management planning, regional
cultural and athletic facilities, and shared-services arrangements, though action in these policy areas
typically requires provincial intervention. The province has recently been interested in promoting
the regionalization of policing (Ibrahim 2019). To date, few RSCs have expanded their activities
beyond their core mandated functions. According to their official websites, five are involved in
tourism promotion, two contribute funding to regional airports, one administers dog control, and
one coordinates affordable housing. The province also established a separate entity in 1998, the
Saint John Regional Facilities Commission, to cost-share facilities operated by the City of Saint
John at the regional scale (New Brunswick 2019). While this entity predates the Fundy RSC, it
could logically be folded into it.
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Table 2.1: Types of local governance entities

Entity

Nu mb e r De s c r i p t i o n

Representati on

Popul ati on
(2016)

Tax Base
Per Capi t a
(2021)

City

8

Municipality with a
Elected mayor and
population of at least council
10,000 at the time of
incorporation.

276,015

$114,829

Town

26

Municipality with a
Elected mayor and
population of at least council
1,500 at the time of
incorporation.

128,746

$99,031

Village

61

Municipality with no Elected mayor and
minimum population council
requirement for
incorporation.

70,855

$70,190

1

Municipality with a
Elected mayor and
population of at least council
15,000 and at least
one existing
municipality at the
time of incorporation.

16,114

$67,383

8

Local body with
Elected mayor and
limited service
council
responsibilities. Not
incorporated, though
authority is similar to
villages.

24,394

$92,341

222,814

$77,638

738,938

$94,805

Regional
Municipality
(enabled 2014)

Rural
Community

Local Service
District

Regional Service
Commission

Total

236

Structure for the
administration and
delivery of local
services to
unincorporated areas
coordinated by the
provincial
government.

Advisory
Committees may
be formed but have
no official authority
or powers

12

Provincially created
bodies to administer
mandated and
voluntarily adopted
services, and act as a
forum for regional
collaboration.

Boards consist of
the mayors of the
region and LSD
representatives

340
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How services are financed
As elsewhere in Canada, local services are financed by a mixture of property taxes, user fees, and
provincial grants. What sets New Brunswick apart is the degree to which this process is centralized.
Since the Equal Opportunity reform in 1967, the provincial government has collected all property
taxes in the province. This has several components. The provincial government collects a property
tax at a uniform rate across the province for its own purposes. Over and above this levy, it also
collects taxes on behalf of municipalities and rural communities, which determine their own tax
rates, to finance their expenditures. These revenues are returned to municipalities in their entirety.
A small share of the province’s own property tax is transferred to municipalities as an
unconditional grant. Municipalities with below-average fiscal capacity receive an equalization
grant. Across all municipalities, 81% of revenues come from property taxes and 7% from provincial
grants.
In addition, the provincial government levies property tax in unincorporated areas to finance nonuser-fee-supported services. This has two components: a uniform provincial rate and a local rate.
The province sets the local rate for each LSD to cover the costs of locally provided services. LSDs
are also credited an amount to equalize policing costs. As LSDs are not corporate bodies, they do
not actually receive this money. As provincial administrative vehicles, their “budgets” are line items
in the provincial budget. The “grants” are credited against provincial expenses in those areas. Across
all LSDs, 88% of revenues come from property taxes and 6% from grants.
Further complexity stems from the subdivision of some municipalities and LSDs into subareas
with different tax rates. These reflect differential levels of service provision within these
jurisdictions. There are therefore more “taxing authorities”—areas in which discrete tax rates are
levied—than there are municipalities and LSDs.
The Regional Service Commissions add an additional wrinkle. Municipalities pay into their
budgets according to formulas specified in provincial regulation. Solid waste collection costs are
apportioned based on the tonnage of waste collected, land-use planning by share of assessed value
of property, and other common services by equally weighted shares of population and assessed
property value. Contributions to RSC budgets from LSD areas are disbursed by the provincial
government.
While this system’s centralized administration is efficient and, in the spirit of Equal Opportunity, it
facilitates redistribution across space, it does so at the cost of transparency and local democratic
accountability, especially for residents of unincorporated areas. Governed remotely by Fredericton,
the 223,000 New Brunswickers who live in unincorporated areas have little sense of how the taxes
they pay are translated into the services they receive from the province through LSDs or from
RSCs.
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Box 2.1: An Abridged Timeline of Municipal Reform
1963—The Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation chaired by Edward Byrne proposes a
“package deal” reform: abolishing the counties, incorporating villages in unincorporated areas, establishing
metropolitan combined councils, uploading human services responsibilities to the provinces, and
provincializing the collection and redistribution of a uniform property tax.
1967—Government adopts most of Byrne’s recommendations regarding the provincialization of human
services and local services financing in its Program of Equal Opportunity. A new Municipalities Act abolishes
counties. A total of 77 villages and 92 LSDs are established in unincorporated areas.
1976–1977—The Allen Report recommends replacing LSDs with rural municipalities and planning districts.
The government instead creates more LSDs in remaining unincorporated areas.
1993—The Commission on Land Use and the Rural Environment (CLURE) identifies the lack of elected
representation in LSDs as the cause of inefficient land use, including ribbon development. It recommends
extending District Planning Commissions across the province.
1995—The province enacts the recommendations of CLURE and enables the creation of Rural Communities
with Beaubassin as the pilot project. Miramichi is created through a provincially imposed amalgamation.
1998–2003—Several provincial committees and panels review the Municipalities Act and propose
voluntary municipalization in rural areas and the strengthening of regional planning. No action is taken.
2008—The Report of the Commissioner on the Future of Local Governance, Jean-Guy Finn, recommends a
comprehensive reorganization of local government. Existing LSDs and municipalities would be replaced by
53 municipalities and 12 multi-purpose Regional Service Districts that would replace existing District
Planning Commissions, Solid Waste Commissions, and Community Economic Development Agencies.
2013—The province establishes 12 Regional Service Commissions but leaves existing LSDs and
municipalities in place.
2014—Tracadie is created through the voluntary merger of Tracadie-Sheila with 18 LSDs.
2017—The province modernizes and renames the Municipalities Act as the Local Governance Act, including
streamlining the process for adding or removing services in LSDs.
2021—The province launches the Local Governance Reform initiative, including publishing a Green Paper
outlining options.

How New Brunswick got here: A legacy of provincial patching
The provincial government’s current reform initiative, concretized in the recently released Green
Paper, recognizes that New Brunswick has reached the limits of a half-century of incremental
change. Indeed, the province’s idiosyncratic system has evolved through incremental “patching” in
which later reforms have been layered onto existing systems in ways that have not resolved many
of their inherent problems. Since the current local governance framework was put in place in
1967, over 25 different studies have been conducted on various aspects of local governance in the
province (New Brunswick 2021, 13; Finn 2008, 5). (For an abridged summary, see Box 2.1.)
Successive governments have responded to these studies with piecemeal actions that, in the words
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of one commissioner, do not move beyond the level of “tinkering around the edges” (Finn 2008,
6). Martin (2007, 76) characterizes New Brunswick as “Canada’s … policy laggard when it comes
to municipal reform.”
The modern development of New Brunswick local government began in 1963 with the Report
of the Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation chaired by Edward G. Byrne, which
recommended a “package deal” of far-reaching reforms. Drawing on an extensive study of the
development of New Brunswick local government by University of New Brunswick professor
Hugh Whalen, Byrne noted that, unlike Ontario and most other provinces that had adopted
th
general municipal legislation and comprehensive municipalization in the 19 century, New
Brunswick had retained a patchwork of unreformed local administrative entities: separate enabling
legislation for counties, towns, villages, local improvement districts, and school boards, along with
dozens of special acts incorporating individual cities and towns. Byrne concluded that the only
solution was to start with a clean slate. Justifying the Royal Commission’s “startling, drastic and
even radical” recommendations to skeptical readers, he insisted “that half the problems we studied
are the result of trying so-called ‘easy’ solutions in the past” (Byrne 1963, XVII).
Byrne’s primary objective was to equalize access to services regardless of community wealth. His
“package deal” called for a radical restructuring of local governance and the transfer of some
previously local responsibilities to the provincial level. The 422 school boards would be
amalgamated into larger units and public education would become fully funded by the province.
Counties would be abolished and their role in local administration in small urban settlements
replaced by newly incorporated villages. In his words, the new system would “make it possible for
rural areas to provide local services as justified by local circumstances. … we propose to eliminate
the functional distinction[s] which now exist between urban and rural municipalities” (Byrne
1963, 4). The province would take over property assessment, the administration of justice, and
public health and welfare. To ensure equity of access to services, the province would collect all
property tax and redistribute it to localities in a mixture of unconditional and equalization grants.
Premier Robichaud’s government adopted many, but not all, of these recommendations under the
label of Equal Opportunity. Its provincialization of services to people (as distinct from services to
property)—education, health, and welfare—anticipated other provinces’ actions in future decades
(Martin 2007, 83). Nevertheless, commissioner Jean-Guy Finn remarked in a later report that the
reform brought with it unintended consequences: in retrospect, “what was billed by some as a
‘revolution’ in municipal government organization brought its own set of … glaring structural and
financing weaknesses” (Finn 2008, 7).
While the province abolished counties and centralized the assessment, collection, and
redistribution of the property tax, the government chose not to pursue another of Byrne’s
recommendations: comprehensive municipalization and a system of “combined councils” to jointly
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administer five services in the areas of the eight cities: water, fire protection, police protection,
sanitary sewage disposal and community planning. The many scattered settlements in rural areas
not incorporated as new villages continued to require at least some of the local services or public
works that are normally provided by municipalities; these would now be provided by the province
directly through what became known as Local Service Districts. The abolition of counties without
creating an alternative form of electoral representation for residents of unincorporated areas
established an enduring democratic deficit (Martin 2007, 76). Indeed, Finn (2008, 77) later argued
that most of the local governance problems that have surfaced since the 1966 reforms resulted
from the absence of representative local government for LSD residents.
This problem was formally acknowledged in the 1976 Allen Report less than a decade after Equal
Opportunity’s implementation. The report recommended replacing the remaining unincorporated
areas with 11 Rural Municipalities (Allen 1976, 8–11). This recommendation was rejected; instead,
the government chose to create LSDs in all remaining unincorporated areas. District Planning
Commissions were created around the same time to address the malcoordination of land-use
planning. The two decades following the release of the Allen Report saw the release of multiple
studies and reports related to rural development and land-use planning, many of which came to
similar conclusions, yet successive provincial governments chose not to directly address the
problems of democratic accountability generated by the Equal Opportunity Program’s
implementation.
The government’s response to the 1993 Commission on Land Use and the Rural Environment
(CLURE) represents a further example of provincial patching. Identifying the absence of local
elected representation and decision making as a key problem, the Commission again called for a
combination of municipalization and regionalization to strengthen planning and produce more
efficient land-use outcomes in rural areas. District Planning Commissions would be extended
across the province’s full territory and LSDs would be rationalized into larger Rural
Communities—essentially quasi-municipalities with directly elected councils primarily responsible
for local planning. The primary outcome was a pilot project in which the 12 LSDs served by the
Beaubassin District Planning Commission were consolidated into a Rural Community. The Rural
Community model was not widely implemented; only eight have been created, leaving 236 LSDs
intact.
The provincial government also commissioned studies of local government restructuring in the
eight cities during the 1990s, but these were also mostly not implemented. Initiated following a
1992 discussion paper (Mersereau 1992), these initially resulted in the establishment of the City of
Miramichi by way of amalgamation and the creation of a joint board to regionalize common
services in the Greater Moncton area (Malenfant and Robison 1994; Bourgeois 2005, 246–247).
The Saint John study recommended the consolidation of the region into a single municipality
(Cormier 1997). The provincial government chose instead to consolidate eight suburban
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municipalities into three and legislate cost-sharing for regional facilities. Efforts to promote
voluntary incorporation or amalgamation have, in the 2021 Green Paper’s words, yielded “limited
success” (13). While four areas were annexed into Edmundston in 1998, planned studies of
Bathurst and Fredericton were left unfinished (Bourgeois 2005, 247). The amalgamations of
municipalities and LSDs to form Miramichi in 1995 and Tracadie in 2014 represent exceptions
rather than a trend. (See Table 2.2.)
The 2008 Report of the Commissioner on the Future of Local Governance, Jean-Guy Finn, was
the most encompassing review of local governance since Byrne’s. Finn’s main proposals echoed the
municipalization and regionalization recommendations of earlier studies. He recommended
reorganizing all existing municipalities and LSDs into 53 municipalities with directly elected
councils. Municipal boundaries in the vicinity of the eight cities would be redrawn to ensure city
control over peripheral urban development. In Finn’s view, municipalization and municipal
consolidation would enable the new municipalities to become more capable planners and service
providers while maximally relying on own-source revenues. The province’s fiscal role would be
more circumscribed: addressing disparities through equalization grants.
Finn also proposed creating 12 multi-purpose Regional Service Districts across the province to
coordinate solid waste management and land-use planning, and, on a voluntary basis, tourism,
parks and recreation, economic development, policing, and other functions, with systems of
proportional representation and cost-sharing among constituent municipalities. While the province
chose not to move forward with Finn’s municipalization recommendations, it later proceeded with
the establishment of the 12 Regional Service Commissions.
Table 2.2: Local governments by type, 1976–2021
1976

1994

1999

2008

2021

111

117

103

101

95

Rural Communities

0

0

1

3

8

Regional Municipality

0

0

0

0

1

216

291

271

267

236

Municipalities: Cities, Towns, and Villages

Local Service Districts (LSDs)
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Figure 2.2: Population growth projections, New Brunswick

Projections are from Statistics Canada (2019, Fig. 3.7). The Medium Growth scenario is Statistics
Canada’s M1 Scenario, which presumes that net interprovincial migration will be the same as the
1991/1992–2016/2017 average.

Figure 2.3: Projected population by age cohort, New Brunswick

Working-age
population

Reproduced from Statistics Canada (2019, Fig. 3.8). The M1 (medium-growth) scenario presumes that
net interprovincial migration will be the same as the 1991/1992–2016/2017 average. The FA and SA
scenarios indicate fast- and slow-ageing scenarios, respectively.
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Gearing governance to a challenging demographic and economic context
The Government of New Brunswick is initiating local governance reform as the province faces a
challenging demographic and economic context. The provincial population is growing slowly and
under likely scenarios it is likely to be of similar size or smaller in the future (see Figure 2.2.) A
slow- or no-growth society is an ageing society. Under likely scenarios, the median New
Brunswicker is going to be near or past retirement age within 25 years (see Figure 2.3). A smaller
labour force will shoulder the burden of taking care of an ageing society.
Sub-provincial population forecasts indicate that, under likely scenarios, population growth will be
concentrated in two of the province’s three major cities, while the rest of the province—many
small towns and most rural areas—will experience absolute population decline. (See Figure 2.4.)
Even the most optimistic scenarios indicate that population loss in these areas will not be offset by
immigration.
Figure 2.4: Projected population change by RSC, 2011–36

Source: Balzer and Peters (2018, Table 27). Values shown are for the M1 Scenario.

The taxation, expenditure, and policy delivery implications of this demographic and economic
transformation will be enormous. The provincial government has limited room to manoeuvre.
Reflecting its low fiscal capacity, New Brunswick has long been a net recipient of federal
equalization payments; about 20% of provincial expenditure has been financed by equalization
grants in recent years. The province also remains dependent on federal transfers to finance health
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and social expenditures. While the 2018–19 fiscal year ended with New Brunswick’s first
budgetary surplus in eleven years, health care costs for an ageing population will continue to rise.
The socio-economic gap between urban and rural areas will very likely increase as urban areas
grow faster and become more socially and economically diverse than rural areas. The net payers of
property taxes and net receivers of local services will likely increasingly inhabit different parts of
the province, generating new political and fiscal tensions.
These challenges are not unique to New Brunswick; in fact, they are happening in many parts of
Canada and other countries. However, the stress is especially acute given the province’s small size
and demographic and economic characteristics. In this context, it is crucial that New Brunswick
gets local government right to ensure that benefits and costs are equitably shared and that citizens
have opportunities to fully participate in the difficult decision making to come.

3. The Issues
New Brunswickers face several fundamental issues with respect to local governance: uneven access
to local democratic institutions, eroding property tax fairness, incentives to sprawl near growing
cities, and unnecessary centralization of authority in the provincial government. Each of these
issues is related to the others; addressing them will require a comprehensive perspective rather than
piecemeal change. It will also require recognition of the foundational social fact of New
Brunswick governance: the need to ensure proportionate representation and equitable treatment of
the province’s English- and French-speaking linguistic communities. And moreover, in the context
of New Brunswick’s relatively low level of urbanization relative to the central and western
Canadian provinces, it must also recognize the persistence of rural ways of life and work outside
urban settlements.

Electoral disenfranchisement of unincorporated areas
Residents of LSDs lack something that is the norm in most other provinces, and which 70% of
New Brunswickers possess: directly elected representation in a local government. In essence, the
provincial government is their local government. While the provincial government has long since
established a system for financing and providing services in these areas, and there is a provision
(unevenly taken up) for the creation of LSD Advisory Committees (LACs) (see Box 3.1), the
absence of local elected representation and decision making undermines the local democratic
expression of local preferences and responsiveness to local needs.
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Box 3.1: LSD Advisory Committees
Lacking representative local government, unincorporated areas are directly administered by the province
through Local Service Districts (LSDs) whose boundaries are defined by regulation. LSD residents may form
an advisory committee to the Minister of three to five area residents on petition of 25 residents, or the
Minister may form one unilaterally (SNB 2017, c.18, 169(2)). At least four LSDs do not meet the population
threshold to make a petition. Their purpose is purely advisory and “LSD representatives have no real
authority or powers” (McKendy 2017, 28). While about 69% of LSDs, representing 81% of the
unincorporated population, currently have active advisory committees, many are run by “remote control”
from Fredericton with little local input.2

Eroding tax fairness
The absence of local decision-making institutions in unincorporated areas severs the
accountability linkage between taxation and expenditure levels. Elected municipal councils must
balance their operating budgets in accordance with local desires, needs, and ability to pay. When
taxing and spending for local services are subsumed within broader provincial budgeting processes,
as it is for unincorporated areas, democratic choice and accountability are eroded. Critics have
charged that many LSD residents underpay for the services they receive and are subsidized by
provincial taxpayers in the towns and cities. At the same time, LSD complain that the linkage
between tax rates and benefits is anything but transparent. Establishing local democratic
accountability for taxation and spending should be a central objective of reform. If local services
prove to be unaffordable at reasonable rates of taxation, it should be the job of the equalization
program to address gaps. When implicit subsidies are made explicit, they can become the subject of
democratic deliberation.

Incentives to sprawl near urban centres
City mayors and municipal associations have highlighted a specific implication of the implicit
subsidy of servicing in unincorporated areas near urban municipalities: that it has incentivized
suburban growth beyond city limits. While 54% of New Brunswickers live in the province’s eight
cities, an additional 31% of residents live within a 50km radius of a city hall (8CitiesNB 2020, 7).
The residents of these areas may work in the city and benefit from its services, infrastructure, and
amenities, but they do not pay city taxes. From the city’s perspective, city taxpayers are footing the
bill for costs generated by exurbanites—in essence, subsidizing lower taxes in LSDs. In the short
run this leads to an unfair distribution of costs and benefits and the inefficient allocation of scarce
resources. In the long run, it diverts households that would otherwise locate within cities to nearby

2. A count of active LSD Advisory Committees was provided by the Department of Environment and Local
Government. This proportion has varied over time. According to prior studies, 62% of LSDs had active Advisory
Committees in 1999 and 59% in 2008. The current proportion is almost identical for LSDs with English- or Frenchspeaking majorities.
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unincorporated areas that are subject to less stringent land-use planning, cumulatively producing a
low-density, haphazardly serviced pattern of development that is more expensive to service.

Centralization of authority in the province
A final issue is the unusual degree to which the administration and financing of local services is
centralized at the provincial level in New Brunswick. There are good reasons for this.
Institutionally, the continued location of a substantial proportion of the population in
unincorporated areas, coupled with the absence of counties, has left the province directly
responsible for administering roads and other services that are local responsibilities in other
jurisdictions. To be sure, it may make sense for a small province like New Brunswick to centralize
some functions. Nevertheless, centralization comes at the cost of diminished responsiveness to local
preferences and, as discussed above, the severing of a democratically accountable linkage between
taxing and spending decisions, especially in unincorporated LSD areas.
Devolving the financing and administration of some functions may bring efficiency and equity
gains. The question then becomes which institutions are sufficiently capable to take on devolved
powers and functions. Devolving to units with tax bases that are too small to be able to finance
and professionally staff (or manage contracts for) service delivery accomplishes nothing; the
province would remain responsible, only indirectly rather than directly, again undermining the
accountability linkage between taxing and spending decisions. Economists have also found that
there are “sweet spots” of service catchment size at which the cost per unit of any given service is
optimized (Oakerson and Parks 2011). Go too big or too small and the unit cost increases. The
challenge is to create capable institutions to administer “right-sized” service areas.
One commonly discussed principle for allocating services to particular levels of government is
subsidiarity. Most fully developed in law and practice in the European Union, subsidiarity is the
idea that, provided that it is feasible and the outcomes are efficient and equitable, government
functions should be financed and administered at as low a level as possible in order to maximize
responsiveness and democratic accountability. New Brunswickers may consider whether current or
contemplated arrangements meet this test.

4. Two Pathways for Reform: Municipalization and Regionalization
The historical discussion shows that local government reform proposals have typically focused on
two solutions in New Brunswick: municipalization and regionalization.
Municipalization would entail the incorporation, voluntarily or otherwise, of areas now directly
administered by the province through the LSDs, thereby creating a “wall-to-wall” single-tier
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system of municipal government across the province, much as exists in most other provinces.
Doing so would establish directly elected local councils with taxing and spending authority, and
would entail the creation of new, professionally staffed local administrations. While attractive due
to its institutional symmetry, there are downsides to this approach. Rural units may have to
encompass broad territories in order to be fiscally sustainable. This may dilute the representation of
communities of interest and undermine responsiveness to local concerns. If existing municipalities
remain untouched, the result may be a “doughnut” pattern in which incorporated urban
settlements are surrounded by much larger rural municipalities. If existing municipalities were to
be reformed through large-scale amalgamations, the result may be hybrid urban-rural bodies that
contain a diverse range of conditions and interests. The experience of such amalgamations in
Ontario, Québec, and Nova Scotia in the 1990s and 2000s indicates that while there may be longterm gains as new units slowly develop traditions, practices, and capacities, the short-term
transition costs can be high and, depending on how boundaries are drawn, units may become
paralyzed by conflict among divergent interests.
Regionalization represents a complementary or alternative approach. Finn saw regionalization as a
complement to municipalization, however the RSC experience shows that the former can occur
without the latter. Following this direction, existing local government arrangements may remain in
place, while a new institutional layer is inserted between them and the province to coordinate the
municipal activities and deliver services in unincorporated areas. This is, in effect, what counties
once did in New Brunswick and what they continue to do in many parts of the United States,
th
although historical county boundaries defined in the 19 century are often ill-suited to this task
given contemporary patterns of settlement. At a broader scale, it is also what various types of
“regional intergovernmental organizations” do in the United States, mostly in the fields of
economic development and transportation (Miller and Nelles 2019). Some Canadian provinces—
Alberta and Manitoba in recent years, but also British Columbia in the postwar period—have
created metropolitan bodies to coordinate economic development, land-use planning, and other
functions for their largest cities (Taylor 2020).
New Brunswick has split the difference between these two approaches. As previously discussed,
Allen and Finn both recommended comprehensive municipalization of unincorporated areas. The
province has created several new municipalities through the amalgamation of adjacent LSDs,
towns, and villages, although the more politically thorny agenda of consolidating local government
in the larger urban areas has not borne fruit. From Byrne’s metropolitan councils to the creation of
District Planning Commissions in the 1970s and the Regional Service Commissions in 2013,
regionalization has also been an enduring theme.
In the remainder of this report, we draw on British Columbia’s experience with regional districts to
address the issues motivating local government reform in New Brunswick. This approach, which
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we call representative regionalization, would be minimally disruptive to established institutions and
longstanding traditions and practices.

5. A Modest Proposal: Representative Regionalization
In 2008, the Finn Report noted that “[g]iven New Brunswick’s particular social, cultural and
economic makeup, its special population distribution and geography, as well as its unique history
and set of circumstances in local governance, it is unlikely that one will find a ‘ready-made’ solution
to meet our need for transformational change” (79). Finn believed that New Brunswickers would
“be better served by designing our own governance model” (79).
In this section, we embark on a thought experiment regarding what local governance in New
Brunswick could look like if the provincial government implemented key aspects of a “readymade” model: British Columbia’s regional districts. We call this proposal “representative
regionalization” because it accomplishes two overarching goals. First, it would give 30% of New
Brunswickers voice in local policymaking for the first time. Second, the proposal unlocks the
potential of the 12 Regional Service Commissions. Further regionalizing the financing and
delivery of services would enhance local control over taxing and spending decisions, lead to
greater fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits, and reduce perverse incentives to
inefficient development patterns in areas surrounding urban centres.

Regional districts in British Columbia
The regional district model is widely recognized across the continent as a significant innovation
for its ability to reconcile divergent local interests, increase local governance capacity, and provide
services efficiently and equitably, all while supporting and preserving local autonomy (See Box
5.1). Indeed, focusing on the large-city context, Sancton (2005, 325) writes that:
Although it is impossible to determine objectively an ideal institutional model for
metropolitan governance, it is hard to imagine a mechanism that could better combine
local self-government through established municipalities with the existence of an
institution at the metropolitan level that can both provide a degree of consensual
metropolitan leadership (the strategic plan) and a framework within which municipalities
can voluntarily cooperate with each other.
While much of the focus has been on the Metro Vancouver Regional District, regional districts
exist across British Columbia in a wide range of settings, from metropolitan areas to smaller urban
centres, and also in rural and remote regions.

22

Box 5.1: Research on British Columbia’s Regional Districts
The history and operation of British Columbia’s regional districts have been the subject of considerable
study. For an overview of their initial creation in the context of debates over metropolitan governance in
greater Vancouver and the later development of the Metro Vancouver Regional District’s planning and
service delivery roles, see Taylor (2019, 217–239). Writing in the decade after their creation, Tennant and
Zirnhelt (1972, 1973) and also Collier (1972) discuss how the provincial government empowered regional
districts and encouraged local governments to make greater use of them as a vehicle for service delivery. In
a review of the Capital Region District centred in Victoria, Bish and Filipowicz (2016) conclude that the
system has “fostered very high levels of representation and adjustments to appropriate scales for both the
provision and production of local government services while local elected officials have incentives to take
into account both the costs and benefits of their decisions.” Wolman (2019) provides a recent perspective
on the applicability of the regional district model to other jurisdictions, principally the United States.
Cashaback (2001) provides a comprehensive overview of the structures and functions of regional districts,
concluding that the model provides superior services to rural areas than alternatives while also affording
“flexibility to members and accountability without creating a distinct level of government and bureaucracy”
(11). Comprehensive current information about regional districts is readily available from the Government of
British Columbia’s website.

We are not the first to identify the regional district model as a plausible option for New
Brunswick. Allen considered it in 1976, as did Finn in 2008. Indeed, the regional district model
partly inspired Finn’s proposed Regional Service Districts. What has changed is that New
Brunswick now has eight years of experience with up-and-running Regional Service
Commissions. The institutional foundations of a B.C.-style system have already been constructed.
The current Local Governance Reform process provides an opportunity to realize the full
potential of this system to address persistent problems of local governance and finance in New
Brunswick.
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Figure 5.1: Population of B.C. regional districts by incorporation status

Note: The figure omits the largest and most urbanized regional districts: Metro Vancouver, Fraser
Valley (Abbotsford), and Capital (Victoria). Populations are BC Stats’ 2020 estimates.

Figure 5.1 breaks out the populations of the regional districts in incorporated and
unincorporated areas. For greater comparability with the population sizes of New Brunswick’s
RSCs, the figure omits the three regional districts that contain the province’s largest urban centres:
the Metro Vancouver and Fraser Valley Regional Districts that cover the Lower Mainland (which
together contain over 3 million residents, about 60% of the provincial population), and the Capital
Regional District centred on Victoria (425,000 residents). The remaining regional districts vary in
population from Central Okanagan, centred on Kelowna, with 222,748 residents, to Central Coast,
with only 3,565. The median regional district, Central Kootenay, has a population of 63,911.
Substantial populations live in unincorporated areas in all regional districts. In Cariboo, Central
Kootenay, and Bulkley-Nechako, the unincorporated population is the majority; in Central Coast,
the entire population resides in unincorporated areas.

Comparing New Brunswick to British Columbia: Three challenges in common
To be sure, New Brunswick is different from British Columbia in many ways. It is geographically
much smaller, has a less diverse society and economy, and lacks a major urban area on the scale of
metropolitan Vancouver or Victoria. New Brunswick does, however, face similar challenges today
to those confronted by British Columbia in the mid-1960s when the regional district system was
created.
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1. Inefficient and undemocratic governance of rural and remote places. Then, as today,
British Columbia’s residents mostly inhabited an archipelago of small urban settlements situated in
a vast, sparsely populated province. A significant proportion of the population—about 20%—lived
outside the jurisdiction of incorporated municipalities. Outside of metropolitan Vancouver,
Victoria, and other cities, local services were provided by single-purpose districts, which had
increased in number from 66 in 1945 to over 300 (Meligrana 2003, 132). British Columbia had
never had county government, so there was no existing form of local administration that could fill
the governance gap and rationalize service delivery. Residents of these areas were unrepresented by
any local government and therefore disenfranchised. Municipalization was dismissed as
impracticable. It was understood that to be fiscally viable, municipalities would have to be too large
to be politically acceptable to residents.
2. Coordination of planning and infrastructure in larger urban areas. The provincial
government faced growing pressure to respond to growth-related problems in the burgeoning
Vancouver region and other cities, including coordinating planning and financing infrastructure
(Taylor 2019, 217–221). Imposing a metropolitan government structure on Greater Vancouver, as
Ontario had recently done for Toronto, was politically impossible, and creating special
arrangements for one region would incite jealousies in others.
3. Devolution of provincial administration of services. Where feasible, British Columbia
also wanted to decentralize the administration of services, including hospital financing, policing,
and justice. This would be impossible if no institutions existed that could assume them.
In short, British Columbia in the 1960s faced similar challenges to those confronted by New
Brunswick today: the need to create effective and democratically accountable local governance
outside incorporated areas, coordinate urban development in and around the larger cities, and
establish vehicles for administrative devolution. The politicians in Victoria also faced similar
political dilemmas. There was little appetite among residents and local politicians for disruptive
institutional change, especially if unilaterally imposed by the province.

Design features of regional districts
The solution British Columbia ultimately devised was a system of flexible multi-purpose districts.
Introduced in 1965, they covered virtually the entire provincial territory by 1969. Their
boundaries were based on combinations of recently reformed school districts. Their initial political
acceptability and later effectiveness stemmed from several design features:
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1. Universality. The regional districts were established across almost the entire territory of British
Columbia, not just in urban or rural areas or in Metro Vancouver.3 This neutralized potential
opposition based on the new institutions being perceived as unfair impositions on, or special
treatment for, one part of the province over another.
2. Flexibility. Regional districts vary widely in population, from Metro Vancouver at 2.7 million
people to Central Coast at only 3,500 (see Appendix A). To accommodate differences in service
needs, they began with, and continue to have, few mandated responsibilities. While membership in
a regional district was mandatory for area municipalities and residents of unincorporated areas, the
legislation afforded considerable flexibility regarding what functions they would perform. As thenMinister of Municipal Affairs Dan Campbell put it in a speech to the Union of British Columbia
Municipalities, “It’s up to you to decide how much gas to put into the vehicle—the member
municipalities and areas are in the driver’s seat” (Brown 1968). At the outset, they were made
responsible for solid waste management and emergency planning, assumed responsible for issuing
debt for capital projects on behalf of their members, and were made responsible for provided
service in incorporated areas.
Importantly, member units may opt out of non-mandatory services. If they do so, they neither pay
into nor benefit from them, nor do they participate in decision-making regarding the service. This
means that each service provided by the regional district can potentially have a different service
area. Decisions for such services are made by subsets of the regional district board. As an example,
Metro Vancouver may be the most institutionally complex regional district as its services are
administered by four overlapping service boards with variable member participation
(Metro Vancouver 2021):
• The Metro Vancouver Regional District board governs mandatory services. All 23 member
units participate.
• All member units also participate in the Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation Board.
• Three outlying units do not participate in the Greater Vancouver Water District board
because they are located outside the service area of the water supply system.
• Four units do not participate in the Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District
board because they are located outside the sewer service area.

3. Two parts of British Columbia are not governed by regional districts. The Stikine region in the far northwest
of the province has a population of only about 700 inhabiting a territory larger than New Brunswick as a whole. The
provincial government has always administered the Stikine region directly, and services in the small community of
Atlin, where most of the regional districts live, are provided by a local improvement district similar to an LSD. The
other exception is the Northern Rockies District Municipality in the province’s far northeast, where the regional
district was converted into a single-tier municipality in 2009. Most of its 5,400 residents live in the community of
Fort Nelson.
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Regional districts may also provide services to units located outside their boundaries, in other
regional districts. In this case, those units participate in board governance and financing on the
same terms as other units.
3. Proportionality and fairness. Participation on regional district boards strikes a balance
between representation by population and taking into account the interests of small communities.
The number of directors representing each unit is determined according to a formula that
typically overweights smaller units (see Box 5.2). This encourages the building of consensus
among large and small units. In most circumstances, each director has one vote. When making
financial decisions, however, directors’ votes are weighted to give greater influence to units with
larger populations and tax bases. The average size of a regional district board of directors is 15; the
smallest is 5 and the largest 40 (see Appendix A). The number of directors and their voting
strength for weighted votes is revised after every decennial census to account for changes in the
relative populations of constituent units.
Some services may be self-financed by user fees or subsidized by grants from other levels of
government. Others are financed through proportional contributions by member units
(Government of British Columbia 2007, 5). The default is for each unit to contribute to service
costs in proportion to its share of assessed property value, however the legislation allows for other
options, including by share of population or quantity of service provided. While the allocation of
cost-sharing burdens is often controversial, the principle of proportionate representation and
contribution, along with the flexibility for local members to make design choices, is perceived in
British Columbia as promoting equitable voice and fair treatment, and as a result has stood the test
of time.
4. Accountability. Regional districts enfranchise residents of unincorporated areas by giving
them elected representation on the regional district board. Unincorporated areas are territorially
divided into one or more “electoral areas” based on communities of interest and servicing
requirements. In the Kitimat-Stikine example shown in Box 5.2, unincorporated areas are divided
into six electoral areas ranging in population from 414 to 4,421. Each electoral area elects one
director to the board, the voting strength of each varying in proportion to area population. With
12, Cariboo Regional District has the most electoral areas, while Metro Vancouver has one; the
median regional district has five. Residents of unincorporated areas make up a majority of the
population in four regional districts (see Figure 5.1). Regional districts also provide an avenue for
treaty First Nations to participate in regional governance and services if they so choose; four
regional districts include representatives from Indigenous authorities.
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Box 5.2: How Representation on Regional District Boards Works
Regional districts are incorporated by Order-in-Council through issuing of letters patent, a type of
regulation, the required contents of which are set out in the Local Government Act (s. 41(2)). The letters
patent define the name and outer boundaries of the regional district and electoral areas. Akin to municipal
wards, electoral areas are the territorial basis for electoral representation of residents of unincorporated
areas. The letters patent also define the voting unit, which is used in the statutory formula that defines the
number of directors and their voting strength for each entity. The voting unit varies depending on the total
population of regional district and the population of the smallest constituent entity.
The formula is as follows:
• The voting strength is the population divided by the voting unit, rounding up to the next whole number.
• The number of directors is determined by dividing the voting strength by 5, again rounding up to the
next whole number.
• No entity can have less than one director or a voting strength of less than one.
The voting unit, number of directors, and voting strength in each regional district are summarized in
Appendix A.

Example: The Kitimat-Stikine Regional District
Total population: 37,367
Voting unit: 2,000
Entity

Type

Population

%

Voting Strength

% Directors

%

Terrace
Kitimat
New Hazelton

City
District
District

11,643
8,131
580

31%
22%
2%

6
5
1

23%
19%
4%

2
1
1

17%
8%
8%

Stewart
Hazelton

District
Village

401
943

1%
3%

1
1

4%
4%

1
1

8%
8%

Electoral Area A

1,900

5%

1

4%

1

8%

Electoral Area B

4,421

12%

3

12%

1

8%

Electoral Area C

4,259

11%

3

12%

1

8%

Electoral Area D

595

2%

1

4%

1

8%

Electoral Area E

4,080

11%

3

12%

1

8%

Electoral Area F

414

1%

1

4%

1

8%

37,367

100%

26

100%

12

100%

Total
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Representation on Regional Service Commissions: A thought experiment
As a thought experiment, we developed a scenario in which representation on New Brunswick’s
regional service commissions is reorganized according to British Columbia’s regional district
formula. As a starting point, Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of each New Brunswick RSC that
resides in incorporated and LSD areas. (To enable direct comparison, the population range on the
x-axis is the same as in Figure 5.1.) The RSCs containing New Brunswick’s three largest urban
centres are comparable in population to the Thompson-Nicola (Kamloops) and Nanaimo
Regional Districts—between 100,000 and 200,000 residents. The populations of the remaining
RSCs are in line with those of the smaller regional districts in British Columbia. The median
RSC population size is about 36,000. A majority of residents live in unincorporated areas in four
of the five least populous RSCs.
Figure 5.2: Population of regional service commissions by incorporation status

The next step is to consider representation on RSC boards. As provided for in the Regional Service
Delivery Act, the board of directors comprises each municipal mayor plus representatives for Local
Service District areas. The number of LSD representatives is calculated according to a formula (see
Box 5.3). The formula appears to provide representation for unincorporated residents roughly in
proportion to their share of the regional population, modified by their share of regional assessed
property value. A further clause sets lower (4) and upper (10) bounds on the number of LSD
representatives.
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Box 5.3: New Brunswick’s Current Representation Formula for Unincorporated Areas
Section 7 of New Brunswick Regulation 2012–109 sets out the formula for LSD representation on RSC
boards as follows:
7(1) The number of local service district representatives on a Board shall be determined by the following
formula: (A + B) ÷ 2 = C, where
A is the total population of the local service districts within a region divided by the average
population per mayor in the region;
B is the total combined tax base of the local service districts within a region divided by the average
tax base per mayor in the region; and
C is the number of local service district representatives on a Board.
7(2) For the purposes of this section,
(a) the average population per mayor shall be determined by dividing the number of people residing
in the local governments within a region by the number of mayors in the region, and
(b) the average tax base per mayor shall be determined by dividing the total of the current year tax
bases of the local governments in a region by the number of mayors in the region.
7(3) Despite the number of local service district representatives determined under this section, there shall
be a minimum of four local service district representatives and a maximum of ten local service district
representatives on each Board.
Applying Section 7 yields the following results using Census 2016 populations and 2021 tax base
assessment. Values of C that fall afoul of clause 7(3) are shaded in purple. The actual number of board
members representing LSDs was retrieved from RSC websites.
Population
(2016)
RSC

Tax Base
($ millions 2021)

LSD Representation

LSD

Incorp.

Mayors

LSD

Incorp.

A

B

C

cl.7(3)

Actual

12,930

34,123

10

889

2,925

3.8

3.0

3

4

4

3,976

21,418

8

202

1,535

1.5

1.1

1

4

4

3. Chaleur

13,762

21,348

6

702

1,939

3.9

2.2

3

4

4

4. Acadian Peninsula

14,519

33,579

14

706

2,347

6.1

4.2

5

5

5

5. Greater Miramichi

15,620

21,505

4

967

1,773

2.9

2.2

3

4

4

19,711

10,861

7

1,397

875

12.7

11.2

12

10

10

7. Southeast (Moncton)

29,216

149,525

15

2,814

16,870

2.9

2.5

3

4

4

8. RSC 8 (Sussex)

17,591

11,414

4

1,518

979

6.2

6.2

6

6

*

9. Fundy

12,904

102,719

5

1,429

10,692

0.6

0.7

1

4

4

10. Southwest

15,371

13,353

8

1,369

1,255

9.2

8.7

9

9

9

11. Fredericton

45,497

83,987

13

3,773

10,456

7.0

4.7

6

6

6

21,717

12,292

10

1,533

1,111

17.7

13.8

16

10

10

222,814

516,124

104

17,299

52,756

68

70

64

1. Northwest
2. Restigouche

6. Kent

12. Western Valley
Total

* RSC 8 has been governed by a provincially appointed commissioner since February 2019. It previously
had 6 directors representing LSDs.
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The table at the bottom of Box 5.3 shows what happens when this formula is applied. The
formula does not do a good job of producing outcomes that satisfy Clause 7(3). In eight of the 12
RSCs, the number of representatives is higher or lower than the threshold, in most cases resulting
in overrepresentation of LSDs relative to their share of the population or tax base. The total
number of potential LSD representatives across the province is 70, however in reality there are 64
because RSC 8’s six-member board was replaced by a provincially appointed trustee in 2019 due
to conflict among members. Add the LSD representatives and the mayors together, and we reach a
total of 174 potential RSC board members across the province, 40% of which represent
unincorporated areas, which in turn account for 30% of the population and 25% of the tax base.
Now that we know what representation on RSC boards currently looks like, the next step in our
thought experiment is to apply the B.C. regional district representation formula to the RSCs. This
assumes that the LSDs are abolished, their functions transferred to RSCs, and that electoral areas
are established to provide elected representation for unincorporated residents on RSC boards.
We make the following assumptions:
• The voting unit is set at 2,000 for all RSCs except for those containing the three largest
cities, for which it is set at 3,000: Southeast RSC (Moncton), Fundy RSC (Saint John), and
RSC 11 (Fredericton). This is in keeping with the voting units of similarly sized regional
districts in British Columbia (see Appendix A).
• The unincorporated area of each RSC is divided into four electoral areas to reflect distinct
communities of interest, including those based on language, and the areal differentiation of
service levels. This results in an average electoral area population of about 4,600. (Ensuring
proportionate linguistic representation would not come into play in every RSC; the same
language is used at home by over 90% of residents in six of the 12 RSCs, and by 80% to
90% in three more.)
Table 5.1 shows the results: a total of 170 directors across the province exercising 258 weighted
votes. The unincorporated territory now administered by 236 LSDs would be reorganized into 48
electoral areas. The size of RSC boards would remain roughly the same as they are now. This
scenario is imperfect. If fully implemented, the voting unit and number of electoral areas would be
calibrated to ensure mutually acceptable levels of representation for urban/rural and linguistic
communities of interest while enabling the definition of contiguous service areas. In the New
Brunswick context, it may be appropriate for a unit’s voting strength, which is used for weighted
votes on financial matters, to correspond to its share of the regional tax base. This is what gives
larger units an incentive to fully participate in regional governance. At the same time,
representation for residents of unincorporated electoral areas should be calibrated to enable an
effective voice in servicing and financing decisions.
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Table 5.1: Representation on RSCs using the B.C. formula: A scenario
% in Municipalities
RSC

Pop.

Tax Base

Voting Strength
Municipalities

Directors

Electoral Areas

Municipalities

Electoral Areas

1. Northwest

73%

77%

22

73%

8

27%

11

73%

4

27%

2. Restigouche

84%

88%

13

76%

4

24%

8

67%

4

33%

3. Chaleur

61%

73%

13

62%

8

38%

7

64%

4

36%

4. Acadian Peninsula

70%

77%

25

76%

8

24%

15

79%

4

21%

5. Greater Miramichi

58%

65%

13

62%

8

38%

5

56%

4

44%

6. Kent

36%

39%

9

43%

12

57%

7

64%

4

36%

7. Southeast (Moncton)

84%

86%

58

83%

12

17%

21

84%

4

16%

8. RSC 8 (Sussex)

39%

39%

8

40%

12

60%

4

50%

4

50%

9. Fundy

89%

88%

37

82%

8

18%

10

71%

4

29%

10. Southwest

46%

48%

11

58%

8

42%

8

67%

4

33%

11. Fredericton

65%

73%

37

70%

16

30%

16

80%

4

20%

12. Western Valley

36%

42%

12

50%

12

50%

10

71%

4

29%

Total

75%

25%

258

69%

116

31%

122

72%

48

28%

Note: In this scenario, the voting unit is set at 2,000 for all RSCs except for Southeast (Moncton),
Fredericton, and Fundy (Saint John), where it is 3,000.

Service areas and tax rates
One of the key design features of regional districts is their ability to accommodate different service
areas within a single administrative structure. Beyond mandatory services, territorial units—
municipalities and electoral areas—may choose whether to participate in voluntary regional
services, and taxes or charges are levied only in participating areas. This already occurs under New
Brunswick’s existing system, albeit opaquely, as the province levies different property tax rates in
each municipality and LSD, and sometimes subareas within them.
Figure 5.3 gives a sense of current variation by showing the maximum and minimum tax rates
(the range indicated by the purple bars) and the average tax rate (the white circle) in each RSC.
The range of tax rates among municipalities and unincorporated areas is shown separately for each
RSC. Reflecting lower service levels in LSDs, the average tax rate is considerably lower in
unincorporated areas than in municipalities. (The figure may overstate the effective range of tax
rates as the maximum and minimum amounts may pertain to small units; most residents may pay
rates closer to the average.)
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Figure 5.3: Maximum, minimum, and average tax rates for municipalities and unincorporated areas,
by RSC

Notes: “M” indicates municipalities; “U” indicates unincorporated areas (LSDs). For units where
municipalities and LSDs are divided into subareas with different tax rates, the rates are averaged.
Regional Municipalities and Rural Communities are excluded because different tax rates are levied in
subareas. BIA levies and user fees are not included.

In a regional district-style system, a uniform tax rate would be levied within each unincorporated
electoral area. This tax rate would reflect the combination of regional services in which the
electoral area participates. While drawing the boundaries of the new electoral areas and RSC
service areas would not be a trivial matter, the fact that the range of tax rates among LSDs is fairly
small within most RSCs—on the order of ±20%—suggests that it is feasible. Electoral area
boundaries could be adjusted over time as service areas change. Municipalities would maintain
their current ability to set tax rates for local services through the local democratic process.
The efficiency gains of centralized provincial collection of property taxes from residents would
remain intact. Much as municipalities do today, RSC boards would set tax rates for the services
they provide within their defined service areas. The difference is that inhabitants of unincorporated
areas would now have a transparent and democratically accountable means of determining service
levels and the tax rates to finance them: elected representation on RSC boards.
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6. Representative Regionalization: Delivering the Promise
Through this thought experiment we have sketched out a potential future for local governance in
New Brunswick: representative regionalization. This future is evolutionary, not revolutionary. The
foundation, plumbing, and wiring are already in place in the form of the Regional Service
Commissions, centralized property tax collection, and provincial core and equalization grants to
localities. The next step is to deliver on the democratic potential of the RSCs by enfranchising
residents of unincorporated areas and enabling RSC boards to define service areas and associated
tax rates.
Unlike Jean-Guy Finn’s recommendations in 2008, we do not propose a comprehensive
restructuring of local government. A “big bang” municipalization of unincorporated areas and
redrawing of existing municipal boundaries would likely be a costly and conflictual endeavour.
Implementing British Columbia’s regional district model would resolve the basic problems of the
current system while being minimally disruptive. The high transition costs of municipal mergers
are avoided. Unincorporated areas may remain so. RSC boards could remain about the same size
as they are now.
The real transformation would be with how unincorporated areas are represented and governed,
how decisions regarding local service delivery are made, and how larger municipalities are
incentivized to participate in regional institutions. Let us return to the four issues highlighted in
Section 3 of this report.
1. Democracy for unincorporated areas. For the first time in generations, unincorporated
areas would gain directly elected local representation in proportion to population, giving them
democratic control over service levels and tax rates. The financing and administration of services to
unincorporated areas by a democratically elected regional authority, rather than by the provincial
government, would increase the transparency and accountability of taxing and spending decisions.
The weighted and unweighted voting strength formulas would ensure fair representation of
member units when decisions are made. The use of proportional formulas rather than arbitrary
numbers is key to the acceptability of regional district governance in British Columbia. We would
expect the same in New Brunswick.
2. Greater tax fairness for urban, exurban, and rural residents alike. Regional
infrastructure systems and services would be financed from a regional tax base at rates set by
democratically elected local representatives. Flexible service area boundaries would mean that
residents pay in proportion to, and their representatives only make decisions on, the services they
receive. Regionalization would reduce current fiscal incentives to sprawling development around
the province’s larger urban centres. If tax rates paid by residents more accurately reflect the cost of
services received, including those offered by neighbouring jurisdictions, the differential in tax rates
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between cities and adjacent jurisdictions would narrow. Exurbanites would no longer be able to
free ride on city infrastructure and therefore be subsidized by city taxpayers.
We acknowledge that this approach will shift the incidence of the property tax. Some may pay
higher rates while others pay less, but we cannot identify which with any certainty based on this
proposal. Property tax rates and amounts paid are not isolated from other factors, including the
potential to move from rates to user fees for some services, adjustments to property classification
and associated tax ratios, which services are regionalized, and how service area boundaries may be
drawn. The key innovation, however, is the establishment of a more transparent and accountable
relationship between taxes paid and service received. In particular, residents of unincorporated
areas would for the first time participate in democratic, public decision-making processes to
determine how to pay for the levels of services they desire. While tax changes may be disruptive
for some property owners, the province would also continue to make equalization grants to
compensate for variation in tax capacity and provide property tax relief to low-income residents,
and federal and provincial social programs and income tax systems will continue to provide
support to low-income households.
3. More orderly and cost-efficient growth around urban centres. No boundaries are
perfect, but the RSCs generally encompass regional labour and housing markets. (The most
obvious exception is the division between RSC 9, which contains Saint John, and RSC 8, which
contains what are effectively suburbs.) It therefore makes sense to regionalize decision-making
regarding land-use planning and the administration and financing of infrastructure and services.
Linking infrastructure and service planning and operations to land-use goals at the regional scale
would produce more orderly and efficient urban development patterns in and around New
Brunswick’s larger urban centres. In the long run, more efficient urban development would lower
long-term capital and operating costs, and ultimately tax and fee rates.
4. More creative and effective governance, closer to the people. There are good historical
reasons why New Brunswick governance is so centralized, but there are also good reasons for
devolution today. As we noted at the beginning of this report, New Brunswick’s many localities
face diverse economic and social challenges. Responding to these challenges requires unlocking
local creativity. This proposal does so by empowering localities to set their priorities through
transparent and accountable democratic processes. Enfranchising the 30% of New Brunswickers
who today have no local representation while reinforcing the capacity of RSCs to make and
deliver democratically decided policies would mobilize local potential to address pressing problems
at an appropriate geographic scale: that of the regional housing and labour market.
Devolution does not mean leaving localities to their own fates. In the spirit of Equal Opportunity,
the provincial government must continue to support low-revenue-capacity communities with
equalization grants. It makes sense for a small province like New Brunswick to maintain
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centralized property tax collection and assessment. This is not only administratively efficient; it also
enables the province to redistribute revenue to support struggling areas. Provincial equalization
grants would continue to flow to municipalities as they do today. The difference would be that
provincial fiscal support for service provision in unincorporated areas would be transferred to
RSCs, where its expenditure would be subject to local accountability.
Importantly, representative regionalization is compatible with municipal reform—the annexation
of unincorporated areas to cities, towns, and villages; the incorporation of unincorporated areas;
and the amalgamation of municipalities—but does not require it. There are no doubt many places
across the province where annexation, incorporation, or amalgamation would result in more
efficient planning and service delivery, and better representation for residents. Nothing in this
proposal stops provincial and local governments from pursuing these possibilities, hopefully in a
cooperative manner. However, the selective regionalization of planning and service delivery,
coupled with democratic participation by all residents, may make such disruptive institutional
changes less necessary, as it has in British Columbia.
There are of course many details to be resolved in implementing such a proposal, including
devising formulas for RSC board representation, defining electoral area and service area
boundaries, and modeling the effects of regional service delivery on tax rates and fiscal
equalization to ensure an orderly transition. Nevertheless, we believe that the near- and long-term
benefits are worth it, and that the costs would be less than imposing comprehensive
municipalization and reorganization of municipal boundaries.
Some may see regionalization as a centralizing move. In fact, it is directed toward local
empowerment and the expansion of local democracy and autonomy. Back in 1965, Premier
Robichaud argued that the centralizing elements of Equal Opportunity would not diminish local
autonomy: “Do the proposals we are making truly reduce local autonomy? I contend that they do
not. I contend, rather, that we are giving them greater scope, greater authority and greater financial
soundness to cope with the true functions of local government” (11). He went on to say that “This
Government recognizes that, today, all citizens, whether they own property or rent, have an equal
interest in public affairs and pay an equal share of the cost. They deserve an equal voice” (13).
From the vantage point of 2021, we conclude that, as implemented, Equal Opportunity enabled
the former at the expense of the latter.
Representative regionalization would deliver on Robichaud’s promise of a local government
system that supports, rather than diminishes, local democracy and creative problem-solving. It
would do so by giving locally controlled bodies the powers and resources necessary to meet
today’s and tomorrow’s demands and challenges. New Brunswickers deserve nothing less.
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Appendix A: Representation in B.C. Regional Districts
Population (2020)

Number of Units

Representation

Regional District

Incorp.

Uninc.

Total

Voting
Unit

Alberni-Clayoquot

23,523

10,362

33,885

2,000

3

6

4

14

23

Bulkley-Nechako

19,795

19,918

39,713

3,000

8

7

0

15

19

397,939

27,564

425,503

5,000

13

3

0

24

86

24,158

41,417

65,575

2,500

4

12

0

16

32

0

3,565

3,565

1,500

0

5

0

5

5

Central Kootenay

30,929

32,982

63,911

2,500

9

11

0

20

35

Central Okanagan

204,058

18,690

222,748

4,000

4

2

0

13

52

Columbia-Shuswap

34,871

22,028

56,899

2,500

4

6

0

11

27

Comox

48,602

25,062

73,664

1,500

3

3

0

10

47

Cowichan Valley

50,286

40,490

90,776

2,000

4

9

0

15

48

East Kootenay

47,502

18,280

65,782

2,500

9

6

0

16

31

314,766

20,463

335,229

5,000

6

8

0

23

68

Fraser-Fort George

87,845

16,130

103,975

4,000

4

7

0

14

30

Kitimat-Stikine

22,731

17,190

39,921

2,000

5

6

0

12

26

Kootenay-Boundary

22,765

10,665

33,430

2,500

8

5

0

13

19

2,709,027

28,474

2,737,501

20,000

21

1

1

40

134

7,929

3,841

11,770

600

4

4

0

9

22

128,070

43,920

171,990

2,500

4

7

0

19

68

North Coast

15,479

3,935

19,414

2,000

5

4

0

10

15

North Okanagan

72,038

20,146

92,184

2,500

6

5

0

14

41

Okanagan-Similkameen

65,133

24,924

90,057

1,800

6

8

0

18

54

Peace River

43,722

23,562

67,284

3,000

7

4

0

12

27

Qathet

13,886

7,338

21,224

2,000

1

5

1

7

13

Squamish-Lillooet

40,456

6,907

47,363

2,000

4

4

0

10

25

Strathcona

38,223

11,085

49,308

1,500

5

4

0

13

34

Sunshine Coast

16,398

15,325

31,723

2,000

2

5

1

9

20

122,625

24,807

147,432

3,250

11

10

0

26

52

4,602,756

539,070

5,141,826

n/a

160

157

7

408

1,053

Average

170,462

19,966

190,438

3,172

6

6

0

15

39

Median

40,456

19,918

65,575

2,500

5

5

0

14

31

Capital
Cariboo
Central Coast

Fraser Valley

Metro Vancouver
Mount Waddington
Nanaimo

Thompson-Nicola
Total

Incorp.

Electoral
Areas

Indig.

Directors

Strength

Note: In this summary, Indigenous units comprise Treaty First Nations and Indigenous Government
Districts.
Source: British Columbia (2017).
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